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Abstract
A Software Response to Hard Drive Encryption

Justin John McCarty III
Current computer forensic practices primarily advise analysts to review and search all
digital evidence within designated labs. This practice does not take into account the possibility
of encryption software being present on the suspect machine. As a result, possible evidence
may become unrecoverable to the investigator. This paper will review the current standard
operating procedures used by law enforcement, complications with current procedures with
regard to encryption, and the design of a free to use utility for law enforcement to facilitate live
analysis.
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1 Introduction
1.1 Methods of Encryption
This section contains a broad overview of the terms and technologies referenced and examined
in this paper. These explanations are intended to provide the reader with the minimal working
knowledge needed to understand a software response to hardware encryption. Full detailed
descriptions are outside the scope of this document.
1.1.1

Advanced Encryption Standard
The Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) was introduced by the National Institute of Standards
and Technology (NIST) on November 26, 2001. The AES algorithm (originally named Rijndael) is a
symmetrical key algorithm that is designed to operate on 128-bit blocks of data (National Institute of
Standards and Technology, 2001). It should also be noted that the AES algorithm in both publicly
available and authorized by the NSA for “Top Secret” information.
1.1.1.1 AES Multi-Bit Encryptions Keys
Although the AES algorithm is designed to operate on 128-bit blocks of data, the encryption key
used may appear in three different “flavors” for use (National Institute of Standards and Technology,
2001). These “flavors” represent the different possible encryption key length to be used in the
encrypting and decrypting process. The key may be 128, 196, or 256 bits in length. As such, the total
number of possible key combinations is approximately 3.4e38, 1.0e59, or 1.15e77 for each “flavor”
respectively.
1.1.1.2 Symmetrical Key Use
The AES algorithm is designed to utilize a small, single key for both the encryption and
decryption of data. This provides both a large advantage and disadvantage for the algorithm. The
primary disadvantage to his approach is that the initial party would need to either use a pre-arranged
key decided upon by all involved parties or would need to be able to exchange the key in confidence
with other users. Both approaches are vulnerable to key interception or miscommunication and
jeopardize the encrypted data. However, in exchange, the data may be encrypted and decrypted quickly
with minimal equipment requirements. The AES algorithm is designed to be used by low powered
processors and embedded smart cards (KetuWare).
1.1.1.3 Used by many software programs
Due to the availability, low resource cost, and strength of the algorithm, AES is currently used by
many publicly available software programs using encryption.
1.1.2

RSA Encryption
The RSA algorithm was developed in 1977 by Ronald L. Rivest, Adi Shamir, and Leonard Adleman
(RSA Laboratories). The RSA algorithm is designed to use an asymmetrical key pair to provide both
security and authentication. The keys used in RSA are generally either 1024 or 2048 bits in length.
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1.1.2.1 Asymmetrical keys
Asymmetrical key algorithms utilize two keys to secure data. These keys are referred to as being
either public or private keys. Each key is both unique in value and meaning when used with the RSA
algorithm. The private key is designed to be used as an authentication marker for a user. The idea is
that the key will uniquely identify a user and is kept secret. As such the key is never to leave the host
user or device. While at the same time each user provides a public key. This key is used to verify the
digital signature for a private key (RSA Laboratories, 2002).
In the encryption and decryption process, the public key (known to everyone) is used for
encrypting a message. This message may now only be decrypted using the matching private key of a
user. This is used to ensure that only the desired party can decrypt the data. However, due to the risk
of “fake” messages being sent by other users, a “signing” process may be used by the two parties.
In the signing process, a hash value of the message and a user’s private key are combined to
produce a digital signature. This signature is then verified by the receiving party by using the sender’s
public key and signature to create a new hash value. If this new value and the hash value of the
message match, then the user can be sure that the message is indeed correct and secure.
1.1.2.2 Scalability
As stated, the RSA algorithm uses relatively large encryption keys (1024 or 2048 bit) to encrypt
and decrypt data. In addition, the complexity of the algorithm results in a more hardware intensive
process that may become cumbersome for large quantities of data. As a result, it is common for data to
be encrypted with a strong symmetrical key (AES) and to then transfer the symmetrical key using a
public/private key pair. As a result, the data may be quickly encrypted/decrypted while at the same
time allowing the key to be transferred securely with the users able to verify the authenticity of the
data.
1.1.3

Hardware Encryption of Storage
Hardware based encryption is a method of encryption that implements an encryption algorithm
in a confined physical device. This device may exist in many different forms but, will typically bypass the
use of a system’s CPU and RAM and is not completely accessible by an Operating System. These
hardware devices can provide a method of secure communication between components (both hardware
and software) without exposing the data to unauthorized users.
Examples of hardware encryption include the use of TPM chips (explained in section 1.2) and
secure hard drive controller boards. “Secured” hard drives may operate using many authentication
methods (if enabled) to ensure restricted access to the data. This hardware authentication device may
be as simple as requiring a user to provide a password to the drive during the boot process (Note: This is
separate from any BIOS password security). In this form of operation, the drive may be moved between
computers (that support the drive) and correctly used provided that user knows the password.
However, if the drive uses another hardware component (TPM, Motherboard, etc.) in the authentication
process this is not possible. Under these circumstances the drive will only operate provided that the
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correct hardware is present and the user knows the password (if needed). In this way, the hard drive is
typically referred to as “married” to the computer.
1.1.4

Software Encryption of Storage
Contrary to hardware encryption, software encryption is done in conjunction with a computer
system’s operating system and does not rely on specific system hardware components for
authentication (in a pure form) but instead is pure software. This enables the user with greater
flexibility when encrypting and decrypting data. A user may choose from a broad range of software
applications for software encryption. Some of these commonly used software encryption applications
include:






TrueCrypt
PGP
Wave Systems Corps.
Windows BitLocker
AxeCrypt

These applications provide users with the ability to use several different encryption methods for
protecting data (including combinations of these). These encryption methods include:







DES
Triple-DES
BlowFish
AES
RSA
Etc.

1.1.4.1 Key Storage
Unlike hardware encryption methods, the encryption keys used by software methods do not
possess inherit security when keeping keys a secret. The keys must be kept accessible at all times when
the program is in uses and must be stored “permanently” for future use if the keys are to be reused. As
a result, these keys are often stored in files that are protected using a protected algorithm that requires
little or no user input to decrypt. When the program is in use, the encryption keys may be kept in
protected areas of RAM so that other programs do not have direct access to them (Hargreaves &
Chivers, 2008).
1.1.4.2 Examples of software encryption capabilities
Software encryption programs offer a number of different features in addition to plain file
encryption. The program interacts with the host operating system and has the ability to access
restricted areas of the system. Consider “TrueCrypt”. “TrueCrypt” features can create encrypted
“container files” and create a second bootable (false) operating system (Hargreaves & Chivers, 2008).
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The “container file” is an encrypted space on the hard drive that appears to be a single
unreadable file that actually contains other files. These files are accessible once the software “mounts”
the opened (decrypted) file. The false operating system option provided by “TrueCrypt” is a form of full
disk encryption. A user can have a main (true) operating system that is protected by the “TrueCrypt”
encryption process. A second “clean” (false) operating system is simultaneously created on the disk in a
separate space. When the system is started up, the user will be prompted to provide a startup
password. If a user provides the correct password the “true” operating system will boot. If the wrong
password is used, the “false” operating system (devoid of any hidden or illegal files) is booted.

1.2 TPM Explanation
Trusted computing is the ability to ensure that any system or program is exactly what it claims
to be.
1.2.1

TPM Basics
TPM chips are the result of the collaboration among several industry representatives over the
course of several years. This group, referred to as the Trusted Computing Group (TCG), is comprised of
representatives from both hardware manufacturers and software developers. These representatives
include AMD, Hewlett-Packard, IBM, Infineon, Intel, Lenovo Holdings Limited, Microsoft, and Sun
Microsystems. The group’s goal was to create a chip that allowed a high level of security for users and
still provided a high level of privacy.
All TPM chips that are manufactured and sold must conform to the standards set forth by the
TCG. The standards define not only the hardware specifications of the chip but also outline functionality
that must be available. In the original standards, referred to as 1.1b, functionality was defined but not
how the functionality had to be implemented. As a result, any program developed to use a TPM chip
had to be designed around a specific chip. This led to confusion between developers and reduced the
“real world” effectiveness of the chips. In order to promote development and make the chips more
appealing for use, the group developed the 1.2 specifications.
The 1.2 specifications refined and expanded the 1.1b specifications in two major ways. First, the
1.2 specifications do not define how a chip must implement functionality from a software point of view.
In this regard, all 1.2 chips use the same programming interface for input and output. How the chip
implements each function internally is more or less up to the manufacturer. In this way programs can
be developed for all 1.2 TPM chips. In the 1.2 specifications, the TCG expanded the functionality of the
chips to provide more uses and improve the protection of user privacy.
Though TPM chips are now being manufactured under 1.2 specifications, the specifications are
not yet complete and are still being developed. Therefore developers typically are only using the
functions provided in 1.2 that are backwards compatible with 1.1b.
1.2.2

Uses of TPM
The functionality of TPM chips is rather open ended. The TCG wanted the chips to be able to be
used under any number of circumstances and by any number of programs. With regards to this paper,
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only three commonly used functions will be analyzed. These functions are the identification of other
trusted systems, sealing a system, and file encryption.
The ability to identify other trusted systems encompasses both hardware and software.
Hardware identification comes in several forms with TPM chips. At a local level, it is the goal of the TCG
for TPM chips to be used in any major component of a computer system. The chips would be able to
interact and verify one another for further communication. An example would be if a TPM chip on a
motherboard was programmed only to allow certain hard drives to be used. Whenever a hard drive
would be plugged into the system, the motherboard would verify or reject the drive based on the hard
drives own TPM chip. In this way the system could be sure that all communication with the hard drive
was secure and legitimate. Another hardware implementation of system identification would be remote
computer usage. A system would only remotely communicate with another system if it could be
identified as secure by the chip. From the software perspective, a file could be coded in such a way that
only authorized programs (verified with the TPM) could access it.
The concept of “sealing” a system, using TPM, seems relatively simple but is harder to
implement. A system is sealed by measuring, or hashing, different pieces of the system and storing the
resulting hashes on the TPM chip in areas called Platform Configuration Registers (PCRs). Then, when
the system is restarted a hand-off style boot is preformed. The boot process is a hand-off due to the
fact that before each step of the boot process, a hash is taken and compared against the hash value
stored on the TPM. Using Figure 1 as an example, the process can be more easily explained. The boot
process starts with the “Core Root of Trust Measurement” (CRTM). This area is always considered to be
trust worthy during the boot process. Before moving to the second stage, the BIOS is hashed (arrow 1)
and compared to the stored value in the PCR (arrow 2). If the value matches, the boot process allows
the BIOS to take control (arrow 3) and proceed with booting. If the value does not match, at any point,
the system will not boot.
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Figure 1: Sample Boot Process

When at the BIOS, the systems hardware and boot loader are hashed (arrows 4 and 5) and again
compared to values stored in the PCRs (arrow 6). This part of the process allows the system to verify
that no hardware has been added or removed from the system and be potentially compromised. At the
same time, the integrity of the boot loader is confirmed to be free of malicious code. This processes of
measuring and comparing continues until the system is able to finally load the operating system.
The final major use for TPM, as discussed by this document, is file encryption. File encryption
has been around for years. With the introduction of TPM chips, files and be secured in a much stronger
fashion. This is due to the fact that when files are encrypted or decrypted using TPM it is done
completely within the chip itself. In this way, the encryption key used by the chip cannot be easily found
or seen “in the clear”. The process is independent of both processor and RAM.
1.2.3

Keys
In order to fulfill the requirements of trust, verification, and privacy as stated before, TPM chips
use a series of different encryption keys. Each action taken by a TPM chip is associated with a set of
keys at all times. The style of key generated and used by the chip
Keys stored on a TPM chip are classified as either migratable or non-migratable by nature.
When a key is classified as migratable it means that it is possible to transfer the key from one TPM chip
to another. In this way keys used for functions like file encryption can be backed up in case of hardware
malfunction. It should be noted that while migrating a key, privacy is still protected at all times as the
keys are never seen “in the clear”. When a key is classified as non-migratable it can never leave the
chip. As such, if a file had to be decrypted using one of these keys and the chip failed, the file would
essentially be lost forever.
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When using encryption, an item is locked using either a symmetrical or asymmetrical key
system. In a symmetrical key system the same key used to encrypt a file is used to decrypt it. This is
analogous to locking a door with a simple dead bolt. Unlocking or locking the door requires a single
style key. However, it is possible for multiple copies of a key to exist and all can be used with the lock.
In an asymmetrical system key pairs are used to encrypt and decrypt information. These pairs work in a
one way only fashion. For example, if key “A” is used to encrypt (lock) a file only key “B” can be used to
decrypt (unlock) the file. In the same way, if key “B” encrypts a file, only key “A” can then decrypt it. As
such, a greater inherent safety factor is provided by this method. Therefore TPM chips use an RSA
encryption scheme with asymmetrical keys. This is explained in further detail in another section.
In order to provide better protection and privacy, TPM chips use several different keys to fulfill
different function requirements. In this way, there is never any single “master key” that can
compromise security and give a user full access. The following is a list of the different style of keys
provided by a TPM chip.


Endorsement Key:
The Endorsement key of a TPM chip is unique in its functionality. The key is placed on the chip during the
process of being manufactured. The primary function of the endorsement key is ensure other TPM chips
that a piece of information could only have been encrypted using a TPM chip and is trusted. The private
portion of this key may never leave the chip or be replaced. If the key is lost due to hardware damage, it
is impossible to be recovered.



Storage Root Key (SRK):
The Storage Root Key (SRK) is a unique key that is associated with the owner of a TPM chip. This key is
non-migratable and considered the parent of all other keys. In this way the SRK is guaranteed to always
be present on the chip. As the parent, the SRK must be verified before using any child key in the TPM. It
should be noted that due to the SRK being tied to the owner of the chip, if the owner changes the SRK will
also be changed. Any keys encrypted with the old SRK will be permanently lost.



Storage Keys:
Storage keys are used by a TPM chip to securely store any type of key (including other storage keys).
These keys can be classified as migratable or non-migratable as needed by the chip.



Binding Keys:
Binding keys are used by a TPM chip so securely store symmetrical keys used by a user. In this way,
symmetrical keys are given asymmetrical protection and are never seen “in the clear” where they could
be compromised.



Identity Keys:
Identity keys are a special class of non-migratable keys that are used to ensure that a stored hash value or
other non-migratable key is used for a specific TPM chip. These keys are always created as children of the
SRK to further ensure the key exists within the TPM chip.

1.3 BitLocker
With the introduction of the “Microsoft Windows Vista” operating system, Microsoft developed
and deployed the operating system native encryption program BitLocker. BitLocker is a versatile
encryption program that provides a user with full disk encryption for secure access to files. However,
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BitLocker is distributed only to a select subset of the “Vista” (and upcoming “Windows 7”) version types.
Currently, BitLocker is only shipped with the Ultimate and Enterprise versions.
1.3.1

Technique used to encrypt
In order to encrypt data, BitLocker makes use of an algorithm called “AES-CBC + Elephant
Diffuser”. This algorithm is based on the AES model of encryption that utilizes a “Cipher Block Chain”
(CBC) method. The CBC is designed so that every encrypted block of memory is dependent on the block
directly preceding it. As a result, the blocks are considered to be “chained” and must all be present in
order to be correctly decrypted in full. However, it is possible to decrypt portions of the encrypted text
by altering arbitrary bits and sacrificing previous encrypted blocks (Ferguson, 2006). In order to
overcome this, Microsoft introduced the concept of a diffuser into the algorithm.
The diffuser in the algorithm is designed to scramble the plain text values of a block prior to
being encrypted with the AES-CBC. The method was developed by Microsoft for the specific purpose of
BitLocker. Though the technique is not as proven as the base AES-CBC, the addition of the diffuser can
be shown to be at least as strong as AES-CBC (Ferguson, 2006).
As stated previously, BitLocker is a feature that comes pre-packaged as part of the Vista
(Enterprise and Ultimate) operating systems. As such, the BitLocker process is, at its core, a software
based encryption method. In order to operate, the BitLocker program requires a separate partition (at
least 1.5 gigs) for the encrypting and decrypting process. Once this requirement as been met the
program may then begin the process of encrypting the entire system volume(s).
1.3.2

Protection methods available
The BitLocker application provides users with a variety of different methods to secure their data.
These methods include the use of a basic key, dongle support, TPM support, and combinations.
1.3.2.1

Keys
The single key method of protection requires a user to supply a passphrase for the system to use
for authentication. This passphrase is required by the system during the boot process or when
modifying the BitLocker system. This key may consist of 4 to 20 characters. In addition to the
passphrase, BitLocker will provide the user with a 48 character “recovery key” that may be used to
access the system. The recovery key is used when the system’s hardware or system files have changed.
For example, the recovery key will need to be provided by the user if the hardware has changed or the
system returns from the hibernation state. This recovery key is always generated and upon creation the
user is prompted to save a back up of the key and/or print the key for storage.
1.3.2.2 Dongle
The second method of authentication is the use of a USB dongle. The dongle used for BitLocker
can be any USB storage device and does not require any preparation. BitLocker will save a file to the
drive that contains a set of encryption keys to be loaded before the operating system is permitted to
boot.
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1.3.2.3 TPM
Windows BitLocker was designed from the beginning to make use of the available functions of a
TPM chip (1.2 compliant). In order to achieve this, Windows Vista was designed to natively interface
with the chip in a high level way. This method allows BitLocker to verify the authenticity and stability of
the system without user interaction. In this case, the authenticity of the machine can be comprised of
both hardware configurations and system file status. If the TPM chip is unable to verify the system, the
user may use the previously mentioned recovery key to re-authenticate the system. However, using this
method of protection will permanently link the file system to the specific TPM chip. This will render
simply moving the protected drive to another machine ineffective due to the new TPM chip not
possessing the correct RSA key pair.
1.3.2.4 Combo(s)
The final encryption method available is the ability to use any of the previous methods in
combination with each other. Combinations include any two methods or all three at the same time.
This method provides a multilevel authentication process and the inherit security that comes as a result.
When utilizing this method, it is most common to use the Key and TPM methods (when available)
together. This is a result of the fact that the TPM provides a strong authentication while the Key
provides light user verification.

1.4 Overview of current law enforcement practices
Although digital forensics is a relatively new field in law enforcement, several accepted methods
are practiced in the field. Similar to other law enforcement practices, each case requires a different
approach depending on the surrounding circumstances. The two major circumstances that may be
considered are the warrantless and warranted investigations.
1.4.1

Warrantless Search (“Knock-and-talk”)

1.4.1.1 Explanation
A warrantless search, often referred to a “knock-and-talk”, is a method of investigation that
requires a suspect’s consent to search. An officer must be allowed entry and access to a suspect’s
system before any investigation may take place.
1.4.1.2 Requirements
This style of investigation has no set requirements for the officer to initiate. All that is required
is the suspect’s cooperation and consent. It is typically used in situations where an officer is unable to
obtain a warrant from a judge for a search but feels there is probable cause for investigation. However,
if contraband is located during the investigation, an officer has the ability to immediately request a
warrant to perform an official legal search.
1.4.1.3 Restrictions and allowances on the officer
When operating under the scope of a warrantless situation, an officer has many allowances that
are not available with a strict warrant. One such allowance is that an officer may search anything the
suspect gives consent for. This allows the officer to investigate computer systems, storage devices, and
any other electronic equipment. It is possible to relate this style of search to that of a traffic stop. If an
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officer believes the driver is hiding anything in the vehicle, he may request to look inside. If the driver
refuses, then the officer cannot investigate further without probable cause.
Despite the limited freedom presented by this method, the officer is also under some
restrictions. For any evidence to be used in court, the officer is required to document any actions or
changes performed on system. Further, if the suspect refuses an inspection, the officer must then
obtain a warrant before the search for evidence may proceed further. Failing to observe these
restrictions may result in any evidence found to be thrown out or the entire case itself.
1.4.2

Warrant

1.4.2.1 Explanation
A warrant search is the typical search executed by law enforcement during investigations. A
warrant must be obtained from a Magistrate, State Judge, or Federal Judge. The requirements to obtain
the warrant differ between the different levels of judge. Typically a warrant from a Magistrate is easier
to obtain but is not as strong in court as the others. Likewise, a federal warrant from a Federal Judge
requires more information to obtain and is strongly upheld in court. In general, to obtain the warrant an
officer must put forth a written request to be approved. Within the request is the reason for the search
and the scope of the proposed warrant. If the request is rejected an officer is able to resubmit an
amended request.
The obtained warrant will expressly state the power and scope of the authorized search to be
performed. Officers must conform to these boundaries or risks having any evidence found become
inadmissible in court. If the officer would like to expand the scope of the warrant (including items to be
searched) then the warrant must be amended by a judge or a new warrant must be obtained.
1.4.2.2 Requirements
As stated, an officer may only be obtained through written request to a judge. The request will
include the reasons for the request and the scope of the search. The scope of the search must specify
explicitly the locations to be searched and any and all computer equipment to be searched/seized.
Obtaining a warrant is typically only possible with strong existing evidence or probable cause.

1.5 Potential problems due to Encryption with evidence collection
As encryption becomes more accessible to users and easier to set up, it’s use in forensics cases
is bound in increase. Several cases have already gained notoriety in the press due to the presence of
encryption and how the old laws are being interpreted in response. This introduction of encryption into
computer crime presents new problems in the field of digital forensics. Current law enforcement
procedures are ineffective and may actually cause a loss of evidence if used.
1.5.1

Loss of keys
The major issue with current techniques is the risk of encryption key loss that may occur during
a search and seizure. If encryption is present on the machine and currently in use, the loss of these keys
may resolve in being unable to recover any or all data from the system. Once major way the keys may
be lost is with the sudden loss of power due to law enforcement intervention. If a preview of the system
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is not performed by a technician, standard practice is to immediately remove power to the system to try
and prevent data loss. Under this practice, if any encryption keys are stored in RAM the data will be lost
due to RAM’s inability to retain data without power. Due to most encryption techniques revolve around
software, it is highly probable that encryption keys will be present in RAM.
With the loss of the keys, an officer may not be able to access the data. In this situation the
officer would need to rely on the suspect having a backup or print out of the key that can be located. If
this is not the case, then a legal gray area emerges. Under current law interpretation, courts are divided
on the issue of suspects being obligated to turn over electronic passwords. (CITE THE TWO CASES
FOUND).
In the case of hardware encryption, such as TPM, the system may require re-authentication on
startup or in order to access restricted disk space. If the suspect system is “cloned” as a forensic image,
it will not be able to authenticate the machine even if the encryption keys are known. Even if the
forensic image is placed in the suspect system it may result in the same situation of being unable to
locate the keys for use.
1.5.2

Transparent operation
An often overlooked feature of current encryption methods are the ability to run in a
transparent operation mode. In this style of operation it may not be overtly obvious that an encryption
program is running in the background of the machine. It would also be impossible to tell if hardware
encryption is currently in use without a detailed knowledge of all system components currently in use.
These situations may be due to either the ability of the system to run silent or due to execution only as
needed.
When an encryption program is running silent it is operating with minimal user interaction.
Often times, a user is only required to provide information upon the applications start up process and
then remains in the background as needed. This is further augmented by software being able to
integrate itself with the host operating system. When integrated into the operating system it may
become impossible to differentiate between the program and other system process. For example,
BitLocker does not show up in either a list of running process or services when in use by the machine.
Execution based on events is a second method available that obscures evidence of encryption
being present on the system. A common application of this process would be if the system only
authenticates on events such as start up or returning from a hibernation state. With this scenario,
software applications such as BitLocker and hardware like TPM will not appear to be running during
normal system operation. Another common event is if a software application (such as TrueCrypt) is only
run during the mounting or un-mounting of encrypted file space. When mounted, the encrypted file
space may appear simply as connected drive and not as a software source.
1.5.3

Single Chip Marriage
As previously stated, it is possible to utilize encryption methods that are unique to a specific
system. An example of this capability is the use of TPM encryption chips. One method provided by a
TPM is the ability to authenticate based on hash values taken from the system itself. With this style of
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operation, if any components differ from the “trusted” values the system will not boot correctly.
Similarly, any files that are encrypted using the TPM chip cannot be moved from one system to another
and be decrypted. This holds true even if the same application is used with the same user passphrase (if
used). The RSA keys used between the application and the TPM chip will not match and therefore
cannot be used for the decryption of the files(s).

2 Investigation Techniques
As computer forensics became a more prevalent field and tool for law enforcement
investigations, standards for the seizing and searching of digital evidence came to exist. The techniques
were created to ensure both consistency and legality of the processes used to gather evidence.

2.1 Conventional methods of finding digital evidence
Most often, law enforcement is advised to investigate captured machines in a forensics lab using
“cloned” copies of the suspect drive.
2.1.1

Linux Boot
The Linux boot style of procedure is used as both an investigation technique and a cloning
technique. For the purposes of forensics, the Linux system is typically a standalone “live boot” CD that
does not require installation on a drive. This allows investigators the flexibility of searching despite the
currently installed “host” operating system or lack thereof. Using the secondary operating such as Linux
enables an investigator to gain access to sections of the system that are typically locked out by an
operating system such as Windows. Also, live Linux operating systems do not (by default) alter system
files on a hard drive during the boot process or during operation.
2.1.2

Cold Image capture
Often times, when a machine has been seized in an investigation, the system is not investigated
on site by a technician. The investigation and analysis of the system is performed in a forensics lab using
a “Cold Image” or clone. The cold image process is a technique used by investigators to preserve
evidence. In this process, the systems hard drive(s) are loaded into a machine utilizing write blocking
capabilities. The write blocker prevents the investigator or his system to write anything to the drive and
compromising the evidence. The investigator would then use cloning software, such as Linux DD or
AccessData’s FTK Imager, to duplicate the full contents of the hard drive to a new disk. It should be
noted that the term “cold image” refers to the fact that the evidence drive is not booted to during this
process.

2.2 Live methods of finding digital evidence
In recent years, the practice of live investigations has become more common. A trained
computer forensics investigator on site may be able to locate time sensitive data and also capture
volatile data from the system. The two main categories of these live methods are “live image capture”
and “live analysis”.
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2.2.1

Live image capture
Live image capture is the ability of an investigator to capture a forensics image of a running
machine in the field. This method would be appropriate if a system was found running when the
machine is seized. As a reminder, standard operating procedure is typically such that if the machine is
off, do not turn the machine on but instead send it to a laboratory.
2.2.2

Live analysis
The practice of live analysis is a growing method used my investigators to obtain information
from running systems. Live analysis can be used under both a warrant enabled search or a “knock-andtalk”. A “knock and talk” live analysis may allow an investigator to discover questionable material that
may then be used to apply for a warrant.

3 Statement of purpose
As encryption becomes more accessible to the common user, it will change how law
enforcement interacts with suspect machines. Current computer forensic procedures will prove
ineffective against hardware and software based encryption methods. As a result new procedures need
to be developed and used live and on site in order to gather necessary data. This paper will explore the
current options for users to encrypt data, the law enforcement practices currently in use, and the
development of the LEAP utility to assist law enforcement in live forensics.

4 Literature Review
Live computer analysis is currently still an emerging field in computer forensics. As a result, the
publication of papers covering live techniques is not very common. In addition, the use of techniques to
overcome encryption for law enforcement is not widely publicized. Therefore articles that directly
relate to this paper are few.
The paper “Recovery of Encryption Keys from Memory Using a Linear Scan” (Hargreaves &
Chivers, 2008) discusses the ability to obtain encryption keys, specifically TrueCrypt, from an image of
live RAM memory. The author(s) were able to successfully recover the encryption keys used by the
program for protecting files. However, the process used is designed to operate as a proof of concept
only. The process required that a TrueCrypt container file be currently running in memory and that the
program is operating in the standard configuration. Given these results, the author(s) conclude that the
collection of volatile memory should be included in forensic procedures in order to preserve potential
evidence.
The article “Lest We Remember: Cold Boot Attacks on Encryption Keys” (Halderman, et al.,
2008) explored the ability to recover stored encryption keys from a running machines RAM. Unlike the
previous paper, the extraction technique used is performed on site using a secondary machine. The
article details the process of reducing a system’s RAM to below freezing temperatures in order to
preserve transient data. The cold RAM is then analyzed using a network boot to extract possible
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encryption keys. Though the process is successful in the article the practice is not practical for real
world use. The process used in extremely technical, complicated and damaging to the suspect machine.
Finally the article “First commercial tool to crack BitLocker arrives” (Protalinsk, 2009) provides a
brief overview of a piece of commercial software to overcome BitLocker. The software detailed uses a
RAM image obtained from a running system for analysis. The image is parsed for possible keys that may
be used by BitLocker to encrypt the disk. Due to the program requiring a live image of RAM, it indirectly
supports the use of live forensics in investigations. In addition, this program may be used to obtain keys
when the system is running in a non-administrative environment. However, more details are needed
before a conclusive result can be obtained.

5 Overview of LEAP
5.1 Introduction
5.1.1

Need
Current accepted computer forensics procedures dictate that a suspect machine should be
powered off and/or restarted into a forensics safe environment. During this process, transient evidence
will be lost as well as any current connections into encrypted file space. In order to preserve this
evidence, it is imperative to use a “live forensics” environment and gather any possible data. However,
current tools available to law enforcement are unequipped to deal with new advancements in file
encryption and are unintuitive.

5.2 Objective
The purpose of this LEAP tool is to provide law enforcement with a new tool to collect as much
data as possible while operating under a “live environment”. The tool will be loaded onto a currently
running machine for analysis. While running, the tool will conduct some automated information
gathering before allowing the user to interact with the environment. While interacting with the suspect
machine (via the tool) the officer will be provided with constant feedback to ensure correct operation.
The user will have to ability to run automated collection processes as well as execute custom searches.
During the custom searches, the user will have the ability to export any possible evidence to an external
drive for posterity. When the user has finished using the program, a detailed report and log of actions
will be created.
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5.2.1


Abbreviations/Definitions
TPM – Trusted Platform Module
On motherboard chip used to encrypt/decrypt files. Capable of identifying a machine
based on hardware components and restrict access based on hardware settings and security
certificates.



OS – Operating System
System software that allows a user to interact with computer components and to
manage running programs.



Transient Data
Data that is no longer accessible once the computer is powered off or that is easily
changed by the operating system.



User
For the purpose of this document, the user will be considered to be a law enforcement
officer unless otherwise stated.



User Interface
Visual output for a program that allows a user to interact and execute the program.

5.3 Requirements
In order to provide a product that meets the requirements for law enforcement use, those
requirements must first be established. The requirements were designed after deliberation with the
West Virginia Cyber Crime division and the National White Collar Crime Center. This section will outline
the major requirements to be fulfilled by the product.
5.3.1

Implementation Requirements
Table 1 illustrates the implementation requirements for this product. These requirements are
derived from project proposal submitted for the National Institute of Justice by Dr. Roy Nutter.
Implementation
Requirement No.
1
2
3
4
5
6

Implementation Requirement Description
Provide a free utility to law enforcement
Be up to date with current encryption programs
Collect transient data in a organized manner
Follow accepted live forensics practices
Should operate on a major portion of computers
Useable by non-technical users
Table 1 Implementation Requirements
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5.3.2

Engineering Requirements
For each entry in Table 1, one or more “Engineering Requirements” were created to ensure each
requirement was met. These requirements reflect the technical aspects of the product and can be
found in Table 2.
Engineering
Requirement No.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

Engineering Requirement Description
Operate under the Windows XP OS
Operate under the 2.0 .NET Framework
Operate under the Windows Vista OS
Maintain an active log of all actions taken
Provide feedback to the user regarding found files
Locate files currently accessible in encrypted file space
Retrieve information regarding possible encryption
Retrieve any possible encryption keys
Use no software that requires paid licensing
Table 2 Engineering Requirements

5.3.3

Requirements Specifications
For each of these engineering requirements in Table 2, a direct correlation can be shown to the
implementation requirements of Table 1. These correlations are shown in Table 5. Table 5 shows
exactly which implementation requirement(s) is met through each engineering requirement. Each
correlation has been supported by a justification.
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Engineering
Requirement No.
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

Implementation
Requirement No(s).

Justification

Currently the Windows OS contains a majority
market share for personal computer use. Within this
5
market share, Windows XP has been widely accepted for
many years.
Since 2006, the Windows 2.0 .Net Framework
5
has become standard for use with Windows XP.
The Windows Vista OS introduced easy to set
up encryption for users to activate. Under Vista, an entire
2, 5
hard drive may be encrypted and/or linked to hardware
components.
In practice, any actions preformed on a suspect
machine must be logged and documented. This log
4
allows a full record of any and all actions taken by the
user or program.
Under typical circumstances, the product will be
used by individuals who have had exposure to computers
4, 6
but may not possess detailed knowledge. Therefore, the
program should be intuitive to use and still maintain good
forensic practices.
Any files that are located in an encrypted file
space (or memory) may become inaccessible if the
2, 3
machine is logged off or powered off at any time. The
data should be able to be both located and copied to
external sources for preservation.
A user should be notified if any potential files
2, 3
are found to contain encryption. This would allow a user
to take the appropriate steps to preserve the evidence.
If possible, encryption keys should be recovered
so that the data in the encrypted file space can be
2, 3
recovered at a later time. This would allow for a more
thorough analysis under controlled conditions.
Use of licensed (paid) software would require
1
users to pay to use the product.
Table 3 Requirements Specifications

5.3.4

Competitive Benchmarks
For this comparison, the popular forensics software “Forensics Toolkit” (FTK) will be used. This
software is widely used by many law enforcement groups in the United States. The data below was
provided by AccessData’s website. (AccessData)
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Benchmark
Cost
Ease of Use
Support of Encryption

Live Analysis

Comparison Results
At this time, AccessData has removed the cost of the program from
their site. LEAP is a completely free program.
FTK requires extensive training to effectively use the program. LEAP
provides simple point and click interface.
FTK supports the detection of 6 encryption programs and styles.
LEAP is designed to locate 15+ installed applications that may point to
the use of encryption.
FTK is designed to only provide a network based live analysis. This
requires extensive knowledge and training, and additional hardware.
LEAP is designed to run from a single USB enabled device on the
suspect machine.
Table 4 Competitive Benchmarks

5.4 Constraints
In order to achieve the goals of the research project and law enforcement, the LEAP program
must abide by certain constraints. These constraints encompass economic, ethical and social aspects of
use and functionality.
5.4.1

Economic
The LEAP program was to be free of cost. This was the result of the overall goals of the research
project that produced the program. In order to remain free, the program does not make use of any
licensed software. All software created and used for LEAP are publicly available to all users. In addition,
the LEAP software does not violate any license agreements presented by the software in question.
5.4.2

Ethics
In addition to economic concerns, LEAP must also conform to three primary ethical restrictions.
The first main concern is that through the course of use the program must not violate any laws
regarding privacy and searching. In addition, the program must keep a detailed log of any and all actions
taken by the user and program. Finally, the program must take precautions to make sure that no data is
written to the suspect drive by the program.
5.4.3

Social
The program needed to meet three main social goals in order to be successful. First, the LEAP
program needed to be easily used by non-technical users. This is due to the target audience not
necessarily having a technical background or extensive experience. Secondly, the program needed to be
flexible in its use. It needs to allow users to use the functions provided by the system as needed on a
case by case circumstance. Finally, the program must provide intelligent feedback to the user during
operation. This ensures that the user knows what is being done at all times by the program and
confirms the program is operating as intended.

6 LEAP 2.0 Detailed Design
This section will cover the technical aspects of the LEAP program version 2.0. It will cover both
user interaction and the actions taken by the program. Due to being a technical method overview no
source code will be used in this section. A breakdown of the programs functions and specifications can
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be found in the Requirements Specification section of the Appendix. It should be noted that the LEAP
program is built using the .NET 2.0 libraries. As such, at a minimum these libraries must be installed and
running on the suspect machine.

6.1 Execution of Application
The LEAP program is designed to be implemented on mobile storage technology USB storage
devices such as external flash drives and hard drives. As a result, the program is packaged with a simple
Windows “autorun.inf” file. This file is designed for two main applications. The primary application of
the file is to initiate the Windows auto run functionality to immediately start the program on USB
insertion. This allows the user to begin use of the program without the need to locate the executable on
the mobile drive. The secondary use is a backup function in case the auto run capability is not enabled
on the suspect machine. The file instructs the operating system to both name the drive “LEAP” and use
the LEAP icon for identifying the drive. This makes the drive easily located if the user must manually
execute the LEAP executable.

Figure 2: LEAP Device in My Computer

6.2 Start Up Operations
Upon execution, the LEAP program will begin to guide the user through the applications start up
process. The start up process (detailed in the following subsections) is used as the primary source of
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system information and is designed to be almost completely autonomous. The user only needs to
provide basic instructions for it to execute.
It should be noted that due to some possible operating system restrictions, LEAP is designed to
be run as an administrative user. Because LEAP is not being certified by Microsoft, this is achieved by
embedding an application manifest into the executable at compile time. The manifest provides
information to the operating system needed to run in “administrative mode”. As a result of the “User
Account Control” (UAC) system introduced in Windows Vista, the user may be prompted to allow the
program. This notification is dependent on the user’s UAC settings and permission level. An example of
this prompt is illustrated in Figure 3.

Figure 3: Administrative Request

6.2.1

Encryption Check
The first step in the start up process is for the program to attempt to check for known installed
encryption programs. The program will prompt the user upon beginning to this first step. It should be
noted that the encryption check also includes a check for the activation of Windows BitLocker on the
system. For simplicity, each check is broken into individual processes with unique response areas.
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Figure 4: Encryption Check Request

The first check run by the program is for BitLocker encryption. This check uses the “cscript.exe”
executable found included with Windows. The executable is run outside of the Windows shell to ensure
the integrity of the data returned. LEAP passes a Windows command script to the program that
instructs the operating system to return the current state of the BitLocker program. The script is
"c:\Windows\System32\manage-bde.wsf -status". The output of this script is parsed to obtain the
current state of BitLocker as known by the operating system. If BitLocker is found on the system, the
program will again use the “cscript.exe” executable to obtain the stored keys for the system. The script
passed to return the keys is "c:\Windows\System32\manage-bde.wsf -protectors -get ". This will return
the stored keys and protection methods for all drives currently using BitLocker. The user will be notified
of the results of search by a color coded box located next to “BitLocker Detection”. The possible states
for this box are:




Green – BitLocker was not found on the system.
Yellow – BitLocker cannot be conclusively determined as running or not.
Red – BitLocker has been detected on the system.

Any keys located by the program will be reported to the user in the form of both a pop up
message box and saved file on the external drive. Both the file and message box will contain all known
drives using BitLocker, the current protection methods in use, and the keys stored by the system to
access the drives.
The second part of the encryption detection process is the search for installed possible and
known encryption programs. This search is a two stage process to separate the known programs from
the unknowns. The program uses a variant of the file search method (covered further in section 6.3.3.1)
to search for keywords in the systems program files. The keywords used for this process are included in
the plain text file with the program so that users may edit the list as needed without needing to recompile the program. This file is generally made up of generic keywords, such as “crypt”, to cover a
broad spectrum of possible files and can be found in the top directory of the program.
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Upon locating all possible files, the system will begin the second stage of the location process.
This part utilizes a simple string filtering method to parse out specific programs and files. These
keywords, like the generic keywords, are included in a plain text file with the program. The system will
then display all found results to the user in the two provided text boxes (see Figure 5). All possible files
will be displayed in the lower text box and flagged as evidence of “Possible Encryption”. Any known files
will be displayed in the top box in red and flagged as evidence of “Known Encryption”. Also, like the
BitLocker results, a color coded box is provided to the user for quick reference. The box states are:




Green – No files match the list of possible encryption keywords.
Yellow – Files were found to match the keywords for possible encryption.
Red – Files were found the matched the keywords of known encryption programs.

Figure 5: Encryption Results

6.2.2

Information Retrieval
After the system performs the encryption check, the next step is the retrieval of general system
information. This process uses the Win32 API interface built into the .Net framework to retrieve
information such as hard drive partitions, system manufacturer, system model, and attached storage
devices. The purpose for this information is to further identify a suspect’s machine in the reporting
process. This ensures that any actions performed and recorded can be traced back to the system in
question by physical components.
6.2.3

Report
The reporting functionality of the LEAP program allows an officer to maintain an accurate record
of all actions performed by the program at anytime. Any action taken by the program either
automatically or at the officer’s prompting is recorded with the date and time the action occurred. In
addition, the officer is prompted to provide relative “housekeeping” case information such as suspect
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information and the current time as relative to the officer. This information provides the officer with a
quick case reference after the processing is finished. It should be noted that when the officer is first
prompted for this data, that the “Case ID” chosen is used by the program to store any saved or exported
files are a result of the investigation. This allows an officer to use the same external drive for multiple
machines on scene while maintaining data separation from multiple machines.
Information stored by LEAP for reporting is kept in two locations at all times. The primary
location is a temporary database that exists within the system’s RAM. This database structure allows
the program to quickly store, categorize, and retrieve any recorded information in real time. The
advantage to this method is that access times are faster because LEAP does not need to read or write to
any physical storage device. The secondary location that information is stored in is a temporary
“Log.CSV” file on LEAP device. The information stored in this file consists wholly of actions taken by the
LEAP program. The file is designed to exist as a backup file for the officer in case the program is forced
to un-expectedly shut down before a formal report is generated.

Figure 6: Report Information Form

6.2.4

System Analysis
The final action performed by LEAP during the pre-processing stage is the optional performance
of a “System Analysis”. This analysis is runs selected free third-party command line applications. These
applications are used to collect extensive system information from the system for future analysis. The
programs provided are enabled or disabled depending on the operating systems version. This is due to a
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number of the applications being unable to operate correctly under the newer Vista architecture
scheme.

Figure 7: Program Selection

Figure 8: System Analysis Main Screen

6.3 Component Breakdown
This section will discuss the main components accessible by the user from the main LEAP
interface. This interface, referred to as the “LEAP Navigator”, is the primary gateway used to switch
among the main functions of the program.
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Figure 9: LEAP Navigator

6.3.1

Graphic Viewer
The “Graphics Viewer” is a utility provided to the user to be able to locate, browse and export
image files on a suspect machine. The program is capable of either searching all connected drives
(except the LEAP device) or a specific directory recursively. All located files are parsed for known image
files extensions (“jpg”, “png”, “gif”, “bmp”, “tiff”, and “jpeg”) before being loaded into the actual user
interface.

Figure 10: Main Graphics Viewer Interface
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Once loaded, image files are displayed to the user in groups of 25 thumbnail images. This
prevents the program from attempting to load an excessive amount of potentially large image files at
one time. Also, each thumbnail displayed is generated by the system in real time. This allows the
system to not rely on cached system thumbnails that may not be up to date. When browsing, the user is
notified of the total number of pages (sets of 25 images) located and the current page the user is on.
This information is located in the center of the bottom of the interface.
The graphics viewer also provides two other primary functions to the user. The first function is
the ability to see a detailed view of a selected image. If a thumbnail is clicked, the pictured details form
is opened using the given image. This form provides an expanded view of the selected image, two file
hashes of the image, and the ability to directly open the directory of the image. The expanded view
forces the image to open to the dimensions of 455x509 pixels. This allows for a large view of both
smaller files (below 455x509 pixels) and those larger. The form also provides the user with both the
MD5 and SHA1 hash of the selected file.

Figure 11: Picture Details
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The final usage of the graphics viewer is to allow a user to export a given picture or pictures to
the LEAP device. This user is able to use the checkboxes provided under each thumbnail to flag the
image for exporting. In addition, the user has the ability to export all located image files through the use
of the “Export” menu located at the top of the form. Each exported file has its SHA1 hash computed
and saved to the LEAP device as well as the original location of the file and the exported file name. The
exported file name is recorded due to the possibility that the program has had to rename the file in
order to properly save all files. This would occur if two files that were exported contained the exact
same name. Under this circumstance, each subsequent file with the same name will be exported as
“marker.filename”. The marker for each file is an index value of 0,1,2, etc used to retain the distinguish
each file while retaining the actual file name.
6.3.2

Parse Flash Cookies
The “Parse Flash Cookies” component is designed to retrieve a list of websites that have been
visited on the suspect machine. This is possible because the heavy integration of flash in current
websites and because temporary the data from these sites is not cleared by most web browsers. Within
the application data section of the operating system, Macromedia Flash keeps a separate folder for each
unique website visited that contains flash. As a result, LEAP is able to parse the folder names that exist
within “\Macromedia\Flash Player\#SharedObjects” in the “Application Data” folder to obtain the “flash
cookies”.
6.3.3

File Explorer
The “File Explorer” is a means for the officer to explore the suspects system within a controlled
environment. The form is designed to display a directory tree of all located drives/folders and a
summary of all contained files of a selected folder. All folder and file locations are done in real time
each time the user selects a folder “node” from the directory tree. The selected folder is used as the
base for both a .Net directory exploration (Directory.GetDirectory) and .Net file exploration
(Directory.GetFiles). Each file that is returned is checked for Windows recognized file encryption based
on its properties.
Files and folders located by the “File Explorer” are able to be exported to the LEAP device with a
single click within a context menu. For file(s), each file is exported to the LEAP device’s export folder
after being hashed and noted by the program. This information is stored within a CSV file and contains
both the SHA1 hash and the original location of the file on the system. For directories, the user has the
ability to export all files and directories located recursively below the selected file. This export process
maintains the directory structure for all files below the selected folder. Any file(s) exported using these
methods also undergo the same hashing process.
In addition, selected files and folders are designed to be exported to LEAP’s “Graphics Viewer”
for analysis of images. Details of this process can be found in section 6.3.1.
6.3.3.1 File Search
The “File Search” functionality of LEAP is designed be used as both a standalone support class
and as a support form for the “File Explorer”. It is designed to provide the user with several methods to
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search for files on a suspect machine. This section will cover the support form functionality due to the
support class performing the same functions in the background without a user interface.

Figure 12: Primary File Search Interface

6.3.3.1.1 File Keyword Search
This function, file search, provides the ability to locate files and folders by use of keywords. The
program is designed to locate a file based on combination of keywords in the file name that are
provided by the user. Multiple keywords are supported at one time and are neither mutually exclusive
nor mutually inclusive. Furthermore, a user is not required to provide a full word when searching. For
example, the search phrase “th one” will return files and directories that contain “the”,”then”,”that”,
“someone”, “something”, etc. This allows a user to locate files using broad keywords with little
restriction. This keyword search can be applied to either all connected drives (excluding the LEAP
device) or to any top level folder and its containing folders. It should be noted that it is possible for the
search to not access certain folders due to operating system restrictions. An example of this is the
“System Volume Information” folder that is created when a Windows operating system is installed.
Such files are not accessible.
6.3.3.1.2 File Extension Search
Aside from keyword searching, the user has the ability to locate files based on certain
predefined file extensions. These filters may be used in any combination to suit the user’s need. In the
event that no specific file type(s) are selected, the program will default to searching for all file
extensions. The predefined file types are as follows:
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Image Files
o Jpg
o Bmp
o Png
o Tiff
o Jpeg
Video Files
o Wmv
o Mov
o Flv
o Wma
o Avi
o Mpg
Common Files
o Txt
o Doc
o Docx
o Ppt
o Pptx
o Xls
o Xlsx
o Pdf

6.3.3.1.3 File Hash Searching
An additional feature of the file search function is the ability to locate files based on a unique file
hash. The file hash provided by the user may either be a MD5 or SHA1 style hash. This allows a user to
locate a specific file that is suspected to be located on the suspect machine. For example, a file known
have been downloaded from a peer to peer network may be located despite it being moved and
renamed. In addition, the program allows the user to provide a CSV file that contains several file hashes
of intermixed hash types. This file is comprised simply of the first column containing the actual hash and
the second column containing the hash type. Once loaded, the program will verify that all provided
entries are in the correct form and correct type. For example, if a hash is missing a value the user will be
notified of the offending hash and will not attempt to load that entry. All other entries that are correct
will still be loaded into the program.
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Figure 13: Hash Entry

It should be noted that the use of large scale hash searching may take a very long time. As the
number of files located in the search area increases, the time to search will drastically increase. This is
due to the programs need to create an open file stream of every located file before a hash may be
computed. As a result, it is not recommend that user performs a hash search over the entire system.
Also, the user is able to use the file type filters in conjunction with the hash searching to reduce the
number of files that need to be processed.
6.3.4

View/Modify Report
The “View/Modify Report” function allows the user to freely alter selected information for the
end report. All information may be edited other than system date/time and the case ID. This is allows
the user to fix mistakes in the report and to add additional information to the “Notes” section of the
report. In addition, the user has the ability to view the current version of the report at anytime from
this screen. Any changes made to the information will be immediately reflected in the report.

7 Conclusions
As hardware and software encryption become common, current law enforcement practices are
obsolete. In order to handle encryption, law enforcement must use live forensic techniques. This MUST
become part of standard operating procedure. In order to assist LE, l the LEAP utility was developed to
provide both encryption detection and live previewing capability.
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9 Appendix
9.1 Engineering/Law Enforcement Need Correlation chart
Engineering
Requirement No.
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

Law Enforcement
Need No(s).

Justification

Currently the Windows OS contains a majority
market share for personal computer use. Within this
5
market share, Windows XP has been widely accepted for
many years.
Since 2006, the Windows 2.0 .Net Framework
5
has become standard for use with Windows XP.
The Windows Vista OS introduced easy to set
up encryption for users to activate. Under Vista, an entire
2, 5
hard drive may be encrypted and/or linked to hardware
components.
In practice, any actions preformed on a suspect
machine must be logged and documented. This log
4
allows a full record of any and all actions taken by the
user or program.
Under typical circumstances, the product will be
used by individuals who have had exposure to computers
4, 6
but may not possess detailed knowledge. Therefore, the
program should be intuitive to use and still maintain good
forensic practices.
Any files that are located in an encrypted file
space (or memory) may become in accessible if the
2, 3
machine is logged off or powered off at any time. The
data should be able to be both located and copied to
external sources for preservation.
A user should be notified if any potential files
2, 3
are found to contain encryption. This would allow a user
to take the appropriate steps to preserve the evidence.
If possible, encryption keys should be recovered
so that the data in the encrypted file space can be
2, 3
recovered at a later time. This would allow for a more
thorough analysis under controlled conditions.
Use of licensed (paid) software would require
1
users to pay to use the product.
Table 5 Engineering/Law Enforcement Need Chart

9.2 Requirements Specification
Requirements Specifications may be obtained through permission of the West Virginia Cyber
Crime Cooperative. (West Virginia Cyber Crime Cooperative, 2009)
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